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A B S T R A C T
This paper applies the methods of multi-dimensional mathematical demography to project national
populations based on alternative assumptions on future, fertility, mortality, migration and educational
transitions that correspond to the ﬁve shared socioeconomic pathways (SSP) storylines. In doing so it
goes a signiﬁcant step beyond past population scenarios in the IPCC context which considered only total
population size. By differentiating the human population not only by age and sex—as is conventionally
done in demographic projections—but also by different levels of educational attainment the most
fundamental aspects of human development and social change are being explicitly addressed through
modeling the changing composition of populations by these three important individual characteristics.
The scenarios have been deﬁned in a collaborative effort of the international Integrated Assessment
Modeling communitywith themedium scenario following that of amajor new effort by theWittgenstein
Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (IIASA, OEAW, WU) involving over 550 experts from
around the world. As a result, in terms of total world population size the trajectories resulting from the
ﬁve SSPs stay very close to each other until around 2030 and by the middle of the century already a
visible differentiation appears with the range between the highest (SSP3) and the lowest (SSP1)
trajectories spanning 1.5 billion. The range opens up much more with the SSP3 reaching 12.6 billion in
2100 and SSP1 falling to 6.9 billion which is lower than today’s world population.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).1. Introduction
The number of human beings on this planet has changed greatly
over the past millennia and was in many aspects linked to changes
in the natural environment—both in terms of being driven by
changes in the environment and also of inducing such changes—as
well as the evolution of technologies and human cultures. It is
estimated that from the appearance ofmodernHomo sapiens some
200,000 years ago in Africa until around 35,000 years ago the total
world population was well under one million and our species was
seriously threatened by extinction (Biraben, 2002). Only after the
Neolithic revolution which introduced agriculture the world
population surpassed 100 million roughly 7000 years ago. But it
was only in the 19th century that population growth really started
to take off in the now industrialized countries as a consequence of a
decline in death rates which was the result of better nutrition,* Corresponding author. Tel.: +43 2236 807 424; fax: +43 2236 71 313.
E-mail addresses: kc@iiasa.ac.at (S. KC), lutz@iiasa.ac.at (W. Lutz).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.06.004
0959-3780/ 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article uimprovements in hygiene and public fresh water supply and other
advances in early preventivemedicine. Right after the end ofWorld
War II death rates then started to fall precipitously in almost all
parts of the world which at this time was also the result of modern
medicine including the invention of antibiotics. But for several
decades birth rates remained very high (and in some cases even
increased due to a better health status of women) since high
fertility norms had been deeply imbedded in most traditional
cultures and religions and such norms tend to change only slowly.
As a consequence, world population size started to ‘‘explode’’ from
2.5 billion in 1950 to somewhat above 7 billion today. But over the
past decades birth rates have also started to decline in many parts
of the world—most dramatically in populous East Asia—giving rise
to the expectation that over the course of the 21st century there is a
high probability that world population will reach a peak and then
start to decline (Lutz et al., 2001).
The scientiﬁc discipline of demography has a rather elaborate
and powerful toolbox for studying population dynamics and
produces detailed population projections according to different
assumptions about the future trend in fertility, mortality,nder the CC BY-NC-SA license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).
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While population growth has been a topic of scientiﬁc enquiry
and discussion for centuries and at least since Thomas Malthus
entered the ﬁeld of structured quantitative analysis, early
population projections only applied an assumed growth rate
to the population total. Only after World War II it became
standard to produce projections that explicitly consider the age-
and sex-structure of the population (the so-called cohort
component method). Hajnal (1955) provides a good overview
of these early population projections. Between 1951 and 2011,
the UN published 22 sets of estimates (past and current
conditions) and projections (future) for all countries and
territories of the world. Before 1978 these projections were
revised approximately every 5 years; since then new revisions
(called assessments and published in their World Population
Prospects series) have been made every 2 years. So far the UN
assessments have provided projections by age and sex for a
medium scenario, and alternative scenarios that are based on
alternative fertility assumptions combined with identical
mortality and migration assumptions.
The World Bank started to produce independent population
projections in 1978. These were always meant primarily for
internal use in the Bank’s development planning and were
published as part of the World Development Report series. After
1984, the World Bank projections were revised approximately
every 2 years and in most cases only one updated variant was
published but with a long time horizon to 2150. Around 1995,
the World Bank stopped publishing separate projections but
presumably continued to use them for internal purposes for a
number of years. The Washington-based Population Reference
Bureau (PRB) publishes independent world population projec-
tions (population size only and a single scenario) every year as
part of its annual World Population DataSheet. The US Census
Bureau (USCB) also produces single scenario projections for all
countries in the world since 1985 with a varying time horizon.
The World Population Program of the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) based outside Vienna (Austria)
began producing global population projections at the level of 13
world regions in 1994. One of the purposes was to produce
population projections as part of the Special Report on Emissions
Scenarios (SRES)(Nakicenovic et al., 2000) that underlie the
global emission scenarios used by the Intergovernmental Panel
for Climate Change (IPCC). This was followed by three rounds of
probabilistic projections at the level of 13 world regions (Lutz
et al., 2008b, 2001, 1997).
2. Key dimensions considered in population projections
For most users of population projections clearly the most
important piece of information is the future total size of the
population. For this reason population size was the only
demographic/social variable considered in the SRES scenarios
complemented only by GDP per capita as an economic variable.
Hence, for many practical purposes population size served
primarily the function of a scaling factor in the calculation of
per capita indicators.
There are two important reasons for population projections to
go beyond the consideration of population size alone, one
methodological and the other substantive. Human populations
are not homogeneous and this heterogeneity greatly matters for
the likely future growth of the population. Populations that are
selective in a way that they have only a small proportion of
women or more elderly people than young adults are likely to
have lower birth rates than population of comparable size but
with a larger proportion of women in reproductive age. In this
sense future population growth is a direct function of theage- and sex-structure of the population and for this reason all
modern population projections do explicitly incorporate these
two sources of population heterogeneity and deﬁne their
assumptions in the form of age-speciﬁc fertility, mortality and
migrations rates.
The age- and sex-composition of the population is also of
interest in its own right. Population aging is considered a highly
important socioeconomic issue which can only be quantitatively
addressed if the age-structure of populations is explicitly
incorporated in the projection model. But the same is true for
other highly relevant individual characteristics such as level of
education and rural/urban place of residence. Both are of dual
signiﬁcance: They are important sources of population heteroge-
neity, inﬂuencing its dynamics, and their changing composition in
the population is directly relevant for anticipating socioeconomic
challenges for mitigation as well as adaptation to unavoidable
climate change. In this paper we will explicitly address the
changing educational structure of populations while the following
paper will deal with the modeling of urbanization (Jiang and
O’Neill, in press).
The methods of multi-dimensional population dynamics are
able to deal with populations that are stratiﬁed by further
demographic dimensions in addition to age and sex. The
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)—
where these methods were originally developed during the
1970s—has recently applied them to produce reconstructions
and projections of populations by age, sex and level of
educational attainment for most countries in the world (KC
et al., 2010; Lutz et al., 2007). Like age and sex, education is also
an important source of population heterogeneity and bears a
signiﬁcant weight of its own. Almost universally more educated
people have lower mortality, and there is sufﬁcient evidence that
this is a real effect and not just owing to selectivity. Lutz and
Skirbekk (2013) discuss the issue of causality in the effects of
education and bring together many studies based on natural
experiments, instrumental variable models and other
approaches that clearly demonstrate that this almost universal
association is not a spurious effect. They coin the notion of
‘‘functional causality’’ to indicate that—while it is nearly
impossible to proof causality for all times and all different
cultural settings—there are good reasons to assume that the
effect of education on lowering mortality and fertility can indeed
be assumed to hold over the projection period cover here. Finally,
it needs to be stressed that the indicator of highest educational
attainment that is being used here as the indicator of choice for
all countries is only a proxy for skills and human capital. It does
not include the quality dimension of education (because
empirical data on this tend to be limited to rich countries) nor
does it cover informal education which also contributes to
human capital and for which even less reliable statistical
information exists. In this sense the choice of educational
attainment distribution was primarily driven by pragmatic
considerations as the only indicator available in a rather
consistent way for almost all countries of the world. While the
baseline data distinguish between six educational attainment
categories and the multi-dimensional projections have been
carried out for these six categories, for the purpose of this paper
we collapse them into four categories for the ease of presenta-
tions (for more information about the base line data and
assumptions see KC et al., 2013).
The empirical data show that, in virtually all populations—and
in particular those that are still in the process of demographic
transition—more educated women have lower fertility. These
educational differentials can be very signiﬁcant. The Demographic
and Health Survey for Ethiopia, for instance, shows that women
without any formal education have on average six children,
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Ethiopia, 2012). Because of the strong association between female
education and fertility, future changes in the composition of the
female population by educational attainment make a big
difference. Lutz and KC (2011) have recently shown that
alternative education scenarios alone (assuming identical educa-
tion-speciﬁc fertility and mortality levels) lead to a difference of
more than one billion people in the world population sizes
projected for 2050.
In addition to its effects on population dynamics, the changing
educational composition of the population is also of great
importance for a broad range of social and economic development
concerns. Based on a newly reconstructed set of educational
attainment distributions by age and sex (Lutz et al., 2007) for most
countries back to 1970, it has recently been shown that indeed the
improvement of educational attainment in the working age
population has been the most consistent and signiﬁcant driver
of economic growth around the world (Lutz et al., 2008a). In the
context of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) this
empirically established relationship will also be used to deﬁne
GDP growth scenarios that are consistent with the education-
speciﬁc population scenarios described here. As will be described
in the following section the different SSPs were designed to cover
alternative socio-economic pathways with respect to the different
levels of societal capacities to deal with climate change mitigation
and adaptation challenges.
Beyond economic growth, education as a basic force of
empowering people and providing access to information has
been shown to matter to a large range of important aspect in the
context of sustainable development. There is overwhelming
evidence that education is a key determinant of both infant
mortality (Pamuk et al., 2011) and adult health and mortality (KC
and Lentzner, 2010). But beyond individual beneﬁts, improving
education by age and sex has also been shown to matter for
countries in transition to modern democracies and the rule of law
(Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2008; Lutz, 2009; Lutz et al., 2010). For the
question of food security, it has long been shown that the basic
education of the agricultural labor force is a key factor in
agricultural production (Hayami and Ruttan, 1971). As the set of
Population–Education–Development–Agriculture (PEDA) mod-
els commissioned by the UN Economic Commission for Africa for
a number of African countries shows, when including education
in an agricultural production function, it turns out to be one of
the key determinants in reducing malnutrition and food
insecurity (Lutz et al., 2004). Finally, in the context of adaptation
to climate change, a series of empirical studies on differential
vulnerability to various kinds of natural disasters in different
parts of the world have conﬁrmed the dominating role of
education as an empowering factor that tends to reduce
vulnerability and enhance the adaptive capacity to the negative
consequences of climate change (Frankenberg et al., 2013;
Helgeson et al., 2013; KC, 2013; Sharma et al., 2013; Striessnig
et al., 2013; Wamsler et al., 2012). Hence, it seems very
appropriate for socioeconomic scenarios, which are supposed
to capture the socioeconomic challenges of both mitigation and
adaptation, to enrich the conventional demographic focus on
population size as well as on the age- and sex-structure of the
population through adding education attainment as an addition-
al demographic dimension. Since these dimensions together
comprehensively describe key characteristics of people, with
respect to their mitigative and adaptive capacities, this set of
scenarios may appropriately be called the human core of the
SSPs.
The Wittgenstein Centre (WIC) for Demography and Global
Human Capital (a collaborative effort among the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, IIASA, the AustrianAcademy of Sciences, OeAW, and the Vienna University of
Economics and Business, WU) recently carried out a major expert
inquiry for deﬁning new assumptions for a comprehensive new
set of population projections by age, sex and level of education
for all countries in the world (under an ERC Advanced Granton
‘‘Forecasting Societies’ Adaptive Capacities to Climate Change’’).
More than 550 population experts from around the world
participated in this effort. It consisted of an online questionnaire
that assessed in peer review manner the validity of alternative
arguments that would impact the future trends of fertility,
mortality and migration. In a series of ﬁve meta-expert meetings
held on ﬁve different continents the survey ﬁndings were
evaluated and ultimately translated into numerical assumptions
for the actual projections for all countries. This elaborate process
was concluded in late 2012—just in time to inform the ﬁnal
population scenarios for the SSPs that are being presented in this
paper. All the parameter choices and justiﬁcations of assump-
tions that underlie the projections presented here as well as
detailed country-speciﬁc results are documented in the forth-
coming Oxford University Press book ‘‘World Population and
Human Capital in the 21st Century’’ (Lutz et al., 2014). Earlier
versions of some of the chapters have been published as online
Working Papers (Barakat and Durham, 2013; Basten et al., 2013;
Caselli et al., 2013; Fuchs and Goujon, 2013; Garbero and Pamuk,
2013; KC et al., 2013; Lutz and Skirbekk, 2013; Sander et al.,
2013).
This major new effort in establishing the scientiﬁc basis for
new world population projections by age, sex and level of
education directly fed into the deﬁnition of the SSP scenarios
presented here. Most importantly the expert solicitation mostly
focused on the medium future trajectories of all demographic
components (fertility, mortality, migration and education)
and this medium scenario was by deﬁnition set to be identical
to SSP2 (the ‘‘middle of the road’’ SSP as discussed below). All
the other SSPs were deﬁned through another process of
intensive consultations (at meetings in Utrecht, Boulder, The
Hague and the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis as well as countless teleconferences) among scientists
from the leading Integrated Assessment Modeling groups in
order to assure that the speciﬁc demographic assumptions made
are consistent with the substantive narratives of the respective
SSPs.
The resulting age, sex, and education components of the SSPs
as they were ﬁnalized in January 2013 and are presented in this
paper and in the SSP online data set have been labeled WIC-
SSPs1.0. They are different from earlier education-speciﬁc
projections produced for a smaller number of countries and
based on older base line data by the same authors (Lutz and KC,
2011; Lutz et al., 2007). More recently (in October 2013) a
slightly different updated version has been produced which is
based on more recent information on migration and fertility
trends in some countries (which is labeled WIC-SSPs 1.1). But
since it is the WIC-SSPs1.0 that served as input to the other
groups calculating GDP and other components of the SSPs we will
only present this version in this paper.
3. Translation of SSP storylines into population and education
scenarios
The general SSP rationale as well as the storylines underlying
the individual SSPs have been extensively discussed and
documented in the previous papers (Crespo Cuaresma, in press;
Dellink et al., in press; Leimbach et al., in press; O’Neill et al., in
press) and need not be repeated here. In the following we will
only focus on the speciﬁc way these storylines are translated
into alternative fertility, mortality, migration and education
Table 1
Matrix with shared socioeconomic pathways deﬁnitions for the demographic and
human capital component.
Country groupings Fertility Mortality Migration Education
SSP1
HiFert Low Low Medium High (FT-GET)
LoFert Low Low Medium High (FT-GET)
Rich-OECD Medium Low Medium High (FT-GET)
SSP2
HiFert Medium Medium Medium Medium (GET)
LoFert Medium Medium Medium Medium (GET)
Rich-OECD Medium Medium Medium Medium (GET)
SSP3
HiFert High High Low Low (CER)
LoFert High High Low Low (CER)
Rich-OECD Low High Low Low (CER)
SSP4
HiFert High High Medium CER-10%/GET
LoFert Low Medium Medium CER-10%/GET
Rich-OECD Low Medium Medium CER/CER-20%
SSP5
HiFert Low Low High High (FT-GET)
LoFert Low Low High High (FT-GET)
Rich-OECD High Low High High (FT-GET)
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countries have been distinguished: ‘‘High fertility countries’’ as
deﬁned by a Total Fertility Rate of more than 2.9 in 2005–2010;
‘‘Low fertility countries’’ including all countries with a total
fertility rate of 2.9 and below that are not included in the third
category of ‘‘Rich-OECD countries’’, the latter being deﬁned by
OECD membership and the World Bank category of high income
country (see Table A.1). It is important to note that for this set of
general SSPs countries are assumed to stay in the grouping that
they start out. This may be unsatisfactory for countries that e.g.
are in the midst of a fertility decline and are expected to soon
move in the low fertility group or countries such as Singapore
that a very rich but at this moment not part of the OECD. But
since there is an almost inﬁnite number of ways and times at
which countries could change the groupings it was decided that
this should be left to users who want to deﬁne their country-
speciﬁc SSPs.
The translation of the ﬁve broader SSP narratives into speciﬁc
demographic assumptions reﬂects the following logic. Table 1
summarizes these assumptions according to their implications for
fertility, mortality and migration.
SSP1: This assumes a future that is moving toward a more
sustainable path. In particular the story assumes that educational
and health investments accelerate the demographic transition,
leading to a relatively low world population. Also, in this storyline
the emphasis should shift to strengthening human wellbeing. This
deﬁnition clearly implies for all three country groups lowmortality
and high education assumptions. With respect to fertility
assumptions the story is more complex. For rich OECD countries
the emphasis on quality of life is assumed to make it easier for
women to combine work and family, and hence makes further
fertility declines unlikely. For this reason for this group of countries
the medium fertility assumption was chosen. For all other
countries the low fertility assumptions were chosen as implied
by the assumed rapid continuation of demographic transition.
Migration levels were assumed to be medium for all countries
under this SSP.
SSP2: This is the middle of the road scenario that corresponds
exactly to the medium variant of the new IIASA-VID-Oxford
projections. It combines for all countries medium fertility with
medium mortality and medium migration and the Global
Education Trend (GET) education scenario.SSP3: This scenario refers to a fragmented world with an
emphasis on security at the expense of international develop-
ment. Population growth is assumed to be high in developing
countries and low in industrialized countries. Accordingly,
this scenario assumes high mortality and low education for
all three country groupings. Fertility is assumed to be low in
the rich OECD countries and high in the two other country
groups. Due to the emphasis on security and barriers to
international exchange, migration is assumed to be low for all
countries.
SSP4: This refers to a world of high inequalities, both between
and within countries. There is increasing stratiﬁcation between a
well-educated internationally connected society on the one hand
and a poorly educated society that works in labor intensive low-
tech industries. In terms of education this is reﬂected in a special
scenario that differs from the standard low-high in the sense that
in every country it produces a more polarized education
distribution with a certain group of very highly educated (which
is bigger in the rich OECD countries) and large groups with low
education. In terms of fertility at the national averages this
implies continued high fertility in today’s high fertility countries
and continued low fertility in both groups of low fertility
countries. For mortality the high fertility countries are assumed
to suffer from high levels whereas the other two groups have
medium mortality. Migration is assumed to be at the medium
level for all countries.
SSP5: This refers to a world that stresses technological
progress and where economic growth is fostered by rapid
development of human capital. This is reﬂected in high education
assumptions and low mortality assumptions across all countries.
For fertility again the pattern is strongly differentiated, with
relatively high fertility assumed for the rich OECD countries (as a
consequence of high tech and a very high standard of living that
allows for easier combination of work and family, and possibly
for immigrant domestic assistants) and low fertility assumed for
all other countries. The emphasis on market solutions and
globalization also implies the assumption of high migration for
all countries.
In Table 1 these choices for scenario deﬁnitions are summarized
the speciﬁc choices made result from a lengthy interactive
discussion process among the persons and institutes involved in
this SSP effort. As discussed above, only SSP2 was taken to be
identical in terms of the fertility, mortality and migration
assumptions to the ‘‘medium’’ scenario of the new Wittgenstein
Center projections (WIC-SSPs1.0 called ‘‘IIASA-WIC Population V9’’
in the SSP-Database https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/
SspDb/). These assumptions are described in detail in KC et al.
(2013). The data and assumptions used for the projections
presented in this paper are labeled WIC-SSPs 1.0 reﬂect our work
as of January 2013 and differ slightly from the more recent WIC-
SSPs 1.1 that are described in the KC et al. (2013). One difference
lies in the migration baseline which is due to the fact that the UN
released a new update on global migration stocks that was used to
re-estimate the earlier rates of migration ﬂows. Differences are
only sizeable for small islands and for developing countries with
previously unreliable data. In addition to migration, assumptions
for fertility trends in the near term in a few low-fertility countries
were adjusted with new evidence of postponement of fertility
among young women due to recent economic recession that
started in 2008. Lastly, baseline education distributions for three
countries (Bolivia, Guinea, and Portugal) were corrected. Bolivia
and Guinea had very minor changes however, for Portugal, the
proportions with no education or incomplete was too high in
January version. Due to the marginal nature of these adjustments
the results for longer term population aggregates differ only
marginally.
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Fig. 1. Trends in total world population size to 2100 according to the ﬁve SSPs.
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trajectories result from a model that samples from the collective
experience of all countries that once were in a similar standing,
with respect to the fertility transition, and then adjusts these
modeled values somewhat through the country-speciﬁc infor-
mation, derived from the expert argument evaluation exercise
and the conclusions of the meta-expert meetings. While typically
the resulting trajectories are not very different from those
assumed in the UN 2010 assessment, a signiﬁcant difference lies
in the fact that the long term convergence level for low fertility
countries is assumed to be 1.75 (rather than 2.1 as in United
Nations, 2011). The ‘‘high’’ and ‘‘low’’ fertility scenarios were
essentially deﬁned as being 20% higher and lower than the
medium by 2030 and 25% different by 2050 and thereafter.
Differentials in education-speciﬁc fertility levels started with
those empirically observed in individual countries and then were
generally assumed to converge to a global pattern over the
coming decades.
‘‘Medium’’ mortality assumptions were made on the basis of a
global conditional convergence model, under which it was
assumed that life expectancies in all countries progressively
approach those in regional forerunner countries. These regional
champions themselves would slowly approach the global forerun-
ner (Japan), which is assumed to experience a constant increase of
two years in life expectancy per decade. For the ‘‘high’’ and ‘‘low’’
scenarios it was generally assumed that life expectancy would
increase one year per decade faster or slower than in the ‘‘medium’’
case. For AIDS effected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa special
assumptions were made with larger uncertainty intervals in the
nearer term. Again, the speciﬁc numerical assumptions for each
country result from extensive expert argumentation as documen-
ted in Garbero and Pamuk (2013), Caselli et al. (2013) and KC et al.
(2013).
The migration assumptions are based on a new global level
estimate of the full matrix of in- and out-migration ﬂows as
derived primarily from migrant stock data (Abel, 2013). The
medium scenario then assumes constant in- and out-migration
rates for the coming half century followed by a slow convergence
to zero net migration. It is worth noting that the assumption of
constant rates, rather than constant absolute ﬂows, can over time
produce changes in the absolute ﬂows as a function of changing
national population size (for out-migration) or world population
size (for in-migration). The high migration scenarios essentially
assume 50% higher and the low migration 50% lower migration
than in the medium scenario.
Finally, the different education scenarios require a word of
clariﬁcation. TheGlobal Education Trend (GET) scenario is based on
a Bayesian model that estimates the medium future trajectory in
education-speciﬁc progression rates to higher levels from the
cumulative experience of all countries over the past 40 years. The
resulting education trajectories for each country are not only
considered to be the ‘‘medium’’, but they are also used as the
standard against which all the future education-speciﬁc fertility
and mortality trajectories are being derived from, assumptions of
overall fertility and mortality levels. There are two other
benchmark scenarios with respect to future education trends:
The Constant Enrollment Rates (CER) simply assumes that in each
country themost recently observed level of school enrollment, and
hence education progression, are frozen at their current levels.
Since in many countries the younger age groups are much better
educated than the older ones, even this scenario can lead to some
improvements in adult education levels over the coming decades,
but in the longer run implies stagnation. On the other extreme,
there is the Fast Track (FT) scenario which assumes that the
country will shift gears and follow the most rapid education
expansion experienced in recent history, namely that of SouthKorea. Some of the education scenario choices presented in Table 1
for different SSPs are combinations of the above described stylized
scenarios: FT-GET for SSP1 and SSP5 has been calculated for each
country by taking the arithmetic mean of the education progres-
sion rates implied under the GET and FT scenarios. For SSP4 amore
complex combination was chosen in order to reﬂect the increasing
within-country inequality that storyline implies: ‘‘CER-10%/
GET’’implies that the educational attainment progression ratio
(EAPR) is further reduced by 10%, as compared to CER (and hence
still more pessimistic), for the transitions from no education to
incomplete primary, incomplete primary to completed primary
and from completed primary to completed lower secondary. The
GET transition ratios are assumed for the higher educational
categories which will produce larger groups of elites in these
countries. Under ‘‘CER/CER-20%’’, for the high income OECD
countries, it is assumed that for these higher education groups
the transition rates are 20% lower than under CER and hence also
produce a more polarized society.
4. Results
In terms of total world population size the trajectories
resulting from the ﬁve SSPs stay very close to each other until
around 2030 (see Fig. 1). This is due to the momentum of
population growth and the fact that the differences in the
assumed trajectories of the components only phase in gradually.
By the middle of the century already a visible differentiation
appears with the range between the highest (SSP3) and the
lowest (SSP1) trajectories spanning 1.5 billion. As expected,
during the second half of the 21st century the range opens up
much more with the SSP3 reaching 12.6 billion in 2100 and SSP1
falling to 6.9 billion which is lower than today’s world
population. The medium SSP2 comes to lie at the middle with
9.2 billion in 2050 and 9.0 in 2100. SSP4 and 5 have greatly
differing assumptions in different sets of countries and therefore
at the global level fall in between the extremes, with SSP4 being
slightly above SSP2 and SSP5 above SSP1.
But as discussed above these SSPs produce much more
information than just total population size. They give for every
country and for every point in time for each SSP complete
distributions by age, sex and level of educational attainment. This
rich data is conveniently summarized visually in the form of age
pyramids by level of education as shown in Fig. 2. All the
underlying numerical information is available online under
https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/SspDb/.
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Fig. 2. Example for an age- and education-pyramid: India 2010.
S. KC, W. Lutz / Global Environmental Change 42 (2017) 181–192186Fig. 2 shows the empirically given age- and education pyramid
for India for 2010. To make the picture clearer, the six underlying
educational attainment categories were combined into four, which
refer to no education, some primary, completed junior secondary
and post-secondary education. For children below the age of 15 no
attainment distribution is given because most of them are still in
the process of education. Due to the past high fertility rates and the
resulting young age distribution the shape of the Indian age
pyramid still looks roughly like a pyramid, although due to recent
fertility declines the steps for the age groups below age 20 have
become progressively more narrow. With respect to the education
distribution, the ﬁgure clearly indicates that at all ages women in
India are less educated than men, but for younger age-groups this
gender education gap has been somewhat reduced. For all women
above age 40 the majority is without any formal education. For
younger cohorts the educational attainment has gradually
improved. In particular for the age groups 15–24 already around
half of all women have received at least junior secondary education
as a result of recent government efforts to expand education
particularly in rural areas. For men the educational attainment has[(Fig._3)TD$FIG]
Fig. 3. Population of India by age, sex and educationaalways been higher in any given age group and over time the
average education has also signiﬁcantly improved.
Fig. 3 gives the age- and education-pyramids as projected for
India under the three scenarios as deﬁned for SSP1, SSP2 and SSP3.
Since most of the scenario assumptions (except for mortality)
affect the younger age groups and the time horizon is only 40 years,
the three pyramids are very similar for the elderly population but
differ greatly for the younger ones. Most signiﬁcantly, the shape of
the pyramid varies greatly from SSP1 where much higher female
education togetherwith lower assumed education-speciﬁc fertility
rates result in much lower birth rates which lead to a narrowing of
the base of the age pyramid. SSP2 refers to the scenario that is
considered as medium scenario with some moderate expansion of
education together with more moderate declines in education-
speciﬁc fertility rates. SSP3 in contrast, gives the picture of a stalled
development both with respect to education as well as fertility
declines. As a consequence the pyramid is much broader at the
bottom and the total population of India is much higher. Aside
from the different age and education structures of these scenarios
over the coming 40 years the difference between SSP1 and SSP3 is
already more than 400 million additional people. As shown in
Table 2 below, by the end of the century this difference between
SSP1 and SSP3 for India alone will increase to an incredible 1.5
billion people, which is much higher than India’s total population
today.
The following ﬁgures and tables provide summary indicators
for the different SSPs and different points in time that have been
derived from the fuller age–sex–education-speciﬁc projections as
described above. This information will be presented in the form of
aggregates for major world regions, the world as a whole as well as
for 12 selected countries, two from each world region. The more
detailed information for all countries is provided in the on-line
data base. The presented indicator of Mean Years of Schooling
(MYS) as a summary indicator for the average level of education of
the adult population that is population among economists but does
not reﬂect the distribution of educational attainment. The method
of calculating Mean Years of Schooling presented in this paper is
described in KC et al. (2010) and reﬂect ourwork as of January 2013
(WIC-SSPs 1.0) which differ from the more recent WIC-SSPs 1.1
that are described in KC et al. (2013).
Table 2 as well as Figs. 4 and 5 show that for the world as a
whole the different SSPs cover a broad range of not only total
population sizes but that they are also associatedwith different age
and education distributions. As described above, SSP2, which alsol attainment under SSP1, SSP2 and SSP3 scenario.
Table 2
Total population size and mean years of schooling among adult population aged 15 years and above for major world regions and selected countries.
Region Year Population (in millions) MYS
SSP1 SSP2 SSP3 SSP4 SSP5 SSP1 SSP2 SSP3 SSP4 SSP5
World 2010 6871 6871 6871 6871 6871 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6
2050 8461 9166 9951 9122 8559 12.1 11.2 9.0 8.7 12.1
2100 6881 9000 12,627 9267 7363 14.1 13.4 8.3 8.1 14.2
Africa 2010 1022 1022 1022 1022 1022 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8
2050 1764 2011 2333 2251 1737 11.0 9.7 6.3 5.7 11.0
2100 1865 2630 3947 3622 1808 13.7 12.7 6.4 5.8 13.7
Asia 2010 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9
2050 4734 5140 5656 4965 4721 11.8 10.9 8.8 8.5 11.8
2100 3293 4417 6712 4076 3300 14.0 13.3 8.4 8.2 14.1
Europe 2010 738 738 738 738 738 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
2050 769 762 681 716 847 13.7 13.5 13.0 12.8 13.7
2100 657 702 543 535 915 14.5 14.1 12.8 12.9 14.5
Latin Am. &
the Caribbean
2010 590 590 590 590 590 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0
2050 679 746 859 710 655 12.6 11.9 10.2 9.6 12.6
2100 487 673 1085 567 453 14.7 14.1 10.3 9.9 14.6
Northern America 2010 344 344 344 344 344 13.8 13.8 13.8 13.8 13.8
2050 460 450 372 424 535 14.8 14.6 14.3 14.1 14.8
2100 521 513 290 406 801 15.3 15.1 14.4 14.2 15.2
Oceania 2010 36 36 36 36 36 12.1 12.1 12.1 12.1 12.1
2050 56 57 51 56 64 14.2 13.7 12.8 12.7 14.2
2100 59 65 50 61 87 15.2 14.9 12.4 12.6 15.3
China 2010 1341 1341 1341 1341 1341 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8
2050 1225 1263 1307 1183 1225 12.1 11.7 10.9 10.5 12.1
2100 644 767 1028 555 645 13.9 13.5 11.2 11.3 13.9
Republic of Korea 2010 48 48 48 48 48 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6
2050 48 46 41 44 51 15.0 15.0 14.9 14.8 14.9
2100 32 30 18 24 42 15.5 15.5 15.2 15.0 15.5
India 2010 1225 1225 1225 1225 1225 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
2050 1550 1734 1971 1601 1547 11.6 10.1 7.1 6.8 11.6
2100 1138 1603 2609 1169 1134 14.4 13.7 7.3 7.4 14.4
Indonesia 2010 240 240 240 240 240 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5
2050 271 288 307 261 269 12.4 11.8 10.3 9.8 12.4
2100 184 228 292 152 180 14.8 14.3 10.6 10.7 14.8
Germany 2010 82 82 82 82 82 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6
2050 82 79 67 75 92 16.6 16.4 16.2 16.0 16.6
2100 67 67 38 52 99 17.2 17.0 16.3 16.1 17.1
Russian Federation 2010 143 143 143 143 143 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.6
2050 131 137 134 127 138 11.3 11.1 10.8 10.3 11.3
2100 93 123 149 88 102 11.5 11.3 10.8 10.2 11.5
Kenya 2010 41 41 41 41 41 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2
2050 70 78 96 92 68 13.6 12.8 9.2 8.4 13.6
2100 72 96 161 145 67 15.0 14.5 9.3 9.0 15.0
South Africa 2010 50 50 50 50 50 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6
2050 62 63 62 56 65 12.7 11.7 10.4 9.9 12.7
2100 49 58 71 39 52 13.9 13.3 10.4 10.6 13.9
Egypt 2010 81 81 81 81 81 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6
2050 113 125 141 112 111 12.3 11.8 9.8 9.3 12.3
2100 97 131 198 91 94 14.1 13.7 10.1 10.1 14.1
Turkey 2010 73 73 73 73 73 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
2050 87 96 109 92 87 11.3 10.4 8.1 7.6 11.3
2100 66 90 149 73 66 13.7 13.1 8.2 7.9 13.7
United States of America 2010 310 310 310 310 310 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7
2050 411 402 334 379 476 14.8 14.5 14.2 14.1 14.7
2100 467 459 262 365 713 15.3 15.1 14.3 14.2 15.2
Brazil 2010 195 195 195 195 195 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1
2050 215 232 254 215 213 11.5 10.9 9.7 9.2 11.5
2100 141 188 276 135 139 13.7 13.1 10.0 9.9 13.7
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shows a continued increase of world population size resulting in
9.17 billion in 2050, then peaking around 9.4 billion in the 2070s
and declining somewhat to 9 billion by 2100. This medium
trajectory of world population growth reaching a peak during the
second half of the century is consistent with earlier world
population projections by the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (Lutz et al., 2008b) as well as the United Nations
projections up to 2010 (United Nations, 2009). The UN 2010
assessment (United Nations, 2011) does not project such peaking
because it modiﬁed its assumption of the long term convergencelevel of fertility from previously 1.85 to 2.1.SSP2 as presented here
assumes this long term level to be at 1.75, as is extensively
discussed and justiﬁed as a result of the expert solicitation in
Basten et al. (2013).
The most recent 2012 UN assessment (UN 2013) also does not
result in a peaking during this century predominantly because it
assumes higher fertility trajectories in Africa than it did in previous
assessments. Since in several big African countries (such as
Nigeria) there is even huge uncertainty about the current levels of
fertility, experts tend to differ considerably about the likely future
fertility levels.
[(Fig._4)TD$FIG]
Fig. 4. Population of the World in 2010 by age, sex and educational attainment and in 2050 under SSP1 and SSP3 scenario.
S. KC, W. Lutz / Global Environmental Change 42 (2017) 181–192188In a nutshell, the uncertainty range of future world
population size (from 6.9 billion under SSP1 to 12.6 under
SSP3 in 2100) reﬂects a very signiﬁcant uncertainty about future
fertility, mortality and education trends which translate not
only into different world population sizes but also very different
age and education structures. These scenarios cannot be directly
compared to the UN high and low population variants because
those are only based on alternative fertility assumptions (0.5
children higher and lower than in the medium variant) while
assuming identical mortality and migration patterns and not
explicitly addressing the population heterogeneity with respect
to education.
As discussed in the section describing the scenario assump-
tions above, these differences in total world population size
result predominantly from two forces: different assumed
trajectories in female educational attainment and different
levels of education speciﬁc fertility. Since almost universally
more educated women have lower levels of fertility—an effect
that is particularly strong for countries in the midst of
demographic transition—the changing educational composition
of young women alone is a major factor inﬂuencing population
growth. Lutz and KC (2011) have recently shown that even when
assuming identical education-speciﬁc fertility trends, different
scenarios about future female education levels already can lead
to a difference of more than 1 billion in world population by
2050. When education-speciﬁc fertility levels are also different
across scenarios (as is the case for the SSPs) the inter-scenario
differences are even larger. Alternative mortality assumptions
are of secondary importance when it comes to population size
but are dominating the picture with respect to the future number
of elderly people under different scenarios. Alternative migration
assumptions also can make major differences with respect to
projected national and to a lesser extent regional population
sizes.
Fig. 5 shows the time trend in population sizes by educational
attainment under all ﬁve SSPs. In all cases the absolute number of
people with secondary or tertiary education will increase over the
coming decades. This is a trend that is already pre-programmed in
today’s education structures where almost universally the younger
age groups are better educated than the older ones. This may be
called the momentum of educational improvement which leads to
better future education of the elderly even under the scenarios that
assume no further increase in school enrollment rates (such as
under SSP3). Under SSP1 and SSP5 the global proportion of peoplewith higher education will increase dramatically and the global
mean years of schooling (Mean Years of Schooling in Table 2) of the
total adult populationwill already by 2050 reach 12 years, which is
about the current level in Europe and only somewhat below that in
North America. In other words, under these scenarios the whole
world in 40 years will be as well educated as Europe today and will
most likely experience all the positive consequences that are
associated with higher education, as will be discussed in Section 2
above. Even under the medium SSP2 scenario the global Mean
Years of Schooling will reach 11.2 years by mid-century. But SSP3
and SSP4 draw a much more pessimistic picture that is based on
the assumption of a stagnation of the increase in school
enrollment. In both cases the average education of the world
population will even decline slightly during the second half of the
century, following a minor increase in the nearer future due to the
above described momentum. While under SSP3 there is a parallel
stagnation for all education groups, SSP4 shows an interesting
polarization as is suggested in the storyline for that SSP: Both the
group of completely uneducated people as well as the group with
tertiary education are increasing in size while the middle
categories become less frequent. While the overall mean years
of schooling of these two different scenarios are quite similar the
full education distributions are very different. This is another point
in case for representing and analyzing the full distributions and not
only the Mean Years of Schooling as is done in many economic
growth models.
A similar polarization is shown within countries in Fig 6. with
the example of Kenya. While SSP1 shows that with signiﬁcant
further investments in education over the coming decades,
Kenya by 2050 could already reach an education structure (of
the younger adult population) that is similar to that in Europe
today, SSP3 and SSP4 show the cases of stalled development that
are associated not only with much lower education levels but
also with signiﬁcantly more rapid population growth. While
under SSP1 Kenya’s population will ‘‘only’’ increase from
currently 41 million to 72 million by the end of the century,
under SSP3 it will increase by a factor of four to an incredible 161
million. Again, SSP4 shows a clearly more polarized development
than SSP3 although the mean years of schooling are quite
similar.
Finally, several of the studies about the effects of education
discussed in Section 2 show that the educational attainment
distribution of younger adult women (aged 20–39) is of speciﬁc
critical importance. This is evidently the case with respect to
[(Fig._5)TD$FIG]
Fig. 5. Population of the World in 2010–2100 by broad age-group and educational attainment under SSP1–SSP5 scenarios.
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Fig. 6. Population of Kenya in 2010–2100 by broad age-group and educational attainment under SSP1, SSP3, and SSP4 scenarios.
Table 3
Proportion of female population aged 20–39 by region, year, level of educational attainment and SSP scenario (in %).
Region Year SSP1 SSP2 SSP3 SSP4 SSP5
No
Edu
Prim Sec Tert No
Edu
Prim Sec Tert No
Edu
Prim Sec Tert No
Edu
Prim Sec Tert No
Edu
Prim Sec Tert
World 2010 15 21 49 15 15 21 49 15 15 21 49 15 15 21 49 15 15 21 49 15
2050 2 8 43 47 4 14 53 29 20 26 42 11% 28 24 33 16 2 7 43 47
2100 0 2 35 63 0 5 49 46 24 28 38 9 35 27 21 18 0 2 34 64
Africa 2010 32 31 31 6 32 31 31 6 32 31 31 6 32 31 31 6 32 31 31 6
2050 3 14 47 36 6 25 51 17 33 35 28 5 40 32 21 8 3 14 47 36
2100 0 4 39 57 0 9 56 35 33 35 27 5 41 33 15 11 0 4 39 57
Asia 2010 16 22 49 13 16 22 49 13 16 22 49 13 16 22 49 13 16 22 49 13
2050 2 6 44 48 4 12 55 29 20 25 44 10 28 22 32 17 2 6 43 48
2100 0 2 34 64 1 3 48 49 24 26 41 10 35 22 20 23 0 2 34 64
Europe 2010 0 5 67 28 0 5 67 28 0 5 67 28 0 5 67 28 0 5 67 28
2050 0 1 38 61 0 2 52 46 0 6 67 27 4 5 64 27 0 1 38 61
2100 0 1 30 69 0 1 39 60 0 6 69 25 3 6 60 31 0 1 30 69
Latin Am.and the Caribbean 2010 4 28 52 17 4 28 52 17 4 28 52 17 4 28 52 17 4 28 52 17
2050 0 5 42 52 0 10 56 33 4 29 53 15 14 26 38 22 0 5 42 52
2100 0 1 34 65 0 2 46 52 4 29 52 15 16 31 25 28 0 1 34 65
Northern America 2010 0 4 54 42 0 4 54 42 0 4 54 42 0 4 54 42 0 4 54 42
2050 0 1 33 66 0 2 43 55 0 4 57 39 0 4 65 31 0 1 34 65
2100 0 1 28 71 0 1 33 66 0 4 57 39 0 4 65 31 0 1 28 71
Oceania 2010 3 14 51 33 3 14 51 33 3 14 51 33 3 14 51 33 3 14 51 33
2050 0 5 37 58 1 10 46 44 4 21 48 27 7 18 51 24 0 4 36 59
2100 0 1 30 69 0 2 39 58 6 28 45 21 9 22 45 24 0 1 29 70
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Table A.1
Country groupings.
High fertility countries
(TFR>2.9)
Low fertility countries (TFR2.9)
Rich OECD Others
Afghanistan, Angola,
Belize, Benin, Bolivia
(Plurinational State of),
Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad,
Comoros, Congo, Coˆte
d’Ivoire, Democratic
Republic of the Congo,
Djibouti, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, French
Guiana, Gabon,
Gambia, Ghana,
Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,
Honduras, Iraq, Jordan,
Kenya, Lao People’s
Democratic Republic,
Lesotho, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritania,
Mayotte, Micronesia
(Fed. States of),
Mozambique, Namibia,
Nepal, Niger, Nigeria,
Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Pakistan,
Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Philippines,
Rwanda, Samoa, Sao
Tome and Principe,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Solomon
Islands, Somalia, Sudan,
Swaziland, Syrian Arab
Republic, Tajikistan,
Timor-Leste, Togo,
Tonga, Uganda, United
Republic of Tanzania,
Vanuatu, Yemen,
Zambia, Zimbabwe
Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal,
Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom,
United States of
America, Slovakia,
Republic of Korea
Albania, Algeria, Argentina,
Armenia, Aruba,
Azerbaijan, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belarus, Bhutan,
Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei
Darussalam, Bulgaria,
Cambodia, Cape Verde,
Channel Islands, Chile,
China, China, Hong Kong
SAR, China, Macao SAR,
Colombia, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Dem.
People’s Republic of Korea,
Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Fiji, French Polynesia,
Georgia, Grenada,
Guadeloupe, Guam,
Guyana, India, Indonesia,
Iran (Islamic Republic of),
Jamaica, Kazakhstan,
Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lebanon, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Lithuania,
Malaysia, Maldives, Malta,
Martinique, Mauritius,
Mexico, Mongolia,
Montenegro, Morocco,
Myanmar, Netherlands
Antilles, New Caledonia,
Nicaragua, Oman, Panama,
Peru, Puerto Rico, Qatar,
Republic of Moldova,
Re´union, Romania, Russian
Federation, Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Serbia,
Singapore, South Africa, Sri
Lanka, Suriname, TFYR
Macedonia, Thailand,
Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates,
United States Virgin
Islands, Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela
(Bolivarian Republic of),
Viet Nam
S. KC, W. Lutz / Global Environmental Change 42 (2017) 181–192 191fertility because it covers the prime childbearing ages. It has also
been shown to be the key factor for health and mortality (in
particular of children but also other household members) because
women tend to make decisive household decisions. Hence, female
education is also closely related to household choices with respect
to energy consumption and adaptation. Lutz et al. (2010) even
showed that for quality of governance and democracy female
education tends to be somewhat more relevant thanmale. Several
of these studies show that indeed the distribution matters and not
only the means. Table 3 gives these distributions at the level of
major world regions. They illustrate for instance the signiﬁcant
differences between SSP2, 3 and 4 for 2100 in Africa where the
proportion of women without any schooling is 0%, 33% and 41%
respectively. As discussed above, this can have far reaching
implications in particular to the future adaptive capacity of
societies to unavoidable climate change.
5. Conclusions
The above described new population scenarios by age, sex
and level of educational attainment present a major step forward
as compared to the earlier SRES scenarios that only considered
total population size (Nakicenovic et al., 2000). From a social
science perspective they provide a much richer picture of major
social changes asdescribed along the three key dimensions age,
gender and level of education. It also covers the ‘‘human core’’ of
what the SSP narratives try to capture in terms of the
socioeconomic challenges to both mitigation and adaptation
because all three dimensions are closely linked to the capacities
of human populations to deal with these challenges. In particular
they also help to address the differential vulnerability of
population in the sense that it not only matters where you
are but also who you are in terms of your capabilities and
adaptive capacity. The SSPs are thus a key component of
assessing what constitutes ‘‘dangerous interference’’ with the
climate system (as stated in the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change) in terms of anticipating the impacts that
alternative paths of future climate change may have on human
wellbeing under different scenarios of socioeconomic develop-
ment and adaptive capacity.
These three dimensions as explicitly and quantitatively
modeled and projected in the above described scenarios can also
be directly related to the education goals (universal primary
education and gender equity) of the Millennium Development
Goals and indirectly to the health and poverty goals. They also
directly relate to themain components of theHumanDevelopment
Index (HDI). Level of educational attainment by gender as well as
health and mortality by age and for men and women separately
(which form two of the three components of the Human
Development Index) are explicitly included in the set of indicators
that shape the above described human core of the SSPs. As a next
step these alternative pathways of population and human capital
will be translated into alternative trajectories of future economic
growth in individual countries. This will help to project the third
component of the Human Development Index (in addition to the
education and life expectancy components given here) and to
derive several of the other technology and environment related
dimensions of the SSPs.
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